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influenced how banks were governed, which ultimately influenced how banks did their business.
The original Bank of North American charter that imposed few meaningful restrictions on the
bank’s operation, accountability or governance gave way to the Bank of the United States’s more
restrictive charter that sharply limited its operations, made it accountable to government, and
defined many of its internal governance procedures. Subsequent state charters were more closely
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Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era and Beyond
1. Introduction
In his study of the development of American law, historian Lawrence Friedman (1993)
reminded us that the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government, not the states. Although
the Virginia Declaration of Rights predated the Bill of Rights by 13 years and provided its
philosophical underpinnings, the direction of constitutional influence was from federal to state
levels.ManystatessimplycopiedthefirsttenamendmentstothefederalConstitutionwhendrafting
their own. The hypothesis offered here is that the same federal-to-state line of influence is evident
in early American banking law and policy. Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and New York
chartered banks prior to Congress’s charter of the Bank of the United States in 1791. Yet it was the
BankoftheUnitedStatescharter,notthatofanyofthepreviouslycharteredstatebanks, thatserved
as a model for most subsequent bank charters. The choice to model charters after that of the Bank
oftheUnited States ratherthan thoseoftheearlystatebanks followedfromcontemporaryconcerns
with political governance and reflected the outcome of a wider debate about the nature of
representative government. In addition, the decision to follow the Bank of the United States model
notably influenced how banks were organized, operated and governed.
Translating federal charters into state law was not seamless, and the debates were charged
and rancorous. Although manycontemporaries supported banks and finance, many late-eighteenth
and early nineteenth century Americans saw banking as something to be entered into with caution
if at all. HenryClay, an otherwise ardent spokesman for pro-growth internal improvements such as
roads, turnpikes and canals, was less enthusiastic about banks. During Congressional debate in-3-
1811, Henry Clay labeled the Bank of the United States a “splendid association of favoured
individuals invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privilege” (quoted in
Dorfman 1946, p. 341). Clay’s distaste for the bank sprang not just from a western agrarian’s
conception of banks as promoters of speculation and sharp dealing; rather, his distaste sprang from
amoregeneralviewofthecorporationasaninstrumentofoppressioncapableofrobbingthecountry
of its hard-won republicanism. Americans had fought a war to rid itself of aristocratic privilege.
Corporations smacked of a return to government sanction of privilege.
Early American firms were shaped by contemporary social conceptions of appropriate
horizontal power relations inside the firm and the Federalist era bank, as a corporation, was shaped
by those conceptions (Lamoreaux 1997 and Dunlavy 2006). But the debate was more fundamental
than howpartnersorshareholderswouldtreatwithoneanother. ContemporaryAmericans whohad
nodirectstakeinthebusinesscorporationtookgreatinterestinitsinternalgovernancebecauserules
for how the elite – and make no mistake about it, the elite controlled America’s earliest financial
corporations–sharedpowerwithinthecorporatebodypoliticspoketotheirattitudestowardsharing
power in the wider civic polity.
Incorporating a bank or other business enterprise in the Federalist period was contentious
because of different beliefs about the nature of governance. Was governance to be plutocratic or
democratic?Itwaswithinthisdebatethatthefirstbankswereestablishedandthisdebateinfluenced
how banks were governed, which ultimatelyinfluenced how banks did their business. The political
debates surrounding the establishment of the Bank of North America (1782) and the Bank of the
United States (1791) defined these banks and nearly every bank chartered thereafter up to the mid-
1830s and beyond. Specifically, the liberal Bank of North American charter that imposed few-4-
meaningfulrestrictionsonthebank’soperation,accountabilityorgovernancegavewaytotheBank
oftheUnitedStates’smorerestrictivecharterthatsharplylimiteditsoperations,madeitaccountable
to government, and defined many of its internal governance procedures. And, as all students of
American history are aware, concerns with the role of the corporation within the polity, especially
thelargecorporation,remainedunresolvedthroughJackson’swaronthesecondBankoftheUnited
States, into the progressive era trust-busting, beyond the New Deal reforms, and up to the present.
Debates over the establishment of the country’s earliest banks cast light on the origins of modern
concerns.Ultimately,eighteenth-centuryAmericanswrestledwithquestionsofappropriateinternal
governance, effective transparency, and prudent regulation that remain unresolved into the twenty-
first century.
ThischaptertracesfourfeaturesoftheBankoftheUnitedStatescharterthatfoundtheirway
into many, if not most, state bank charters – charter term limits, partial state ownership, branch
banking, and internal voting rules – and how those features influenced banking for the next half-
century.Chartertermlimitsandstateownershipplayedhavocwithfederalandstatebankingpolicies
because they made banks as much political as economic agents. Branch banking was not widely
adopted, but where it was it generally performed fairly well. The advantages of branch banking
became most apparent during panics and financial crises as banks and branches could support one
another. The adoption of adoption of share voting rules that capped the votes of large shareholders
encouraged small investors. This choice may have affected the ability of entrepreneurs to raise
externalcapitaland,ultimately,thepaceofeconomicgrowth.Throughhisinfluenceoverthecharter
of the Bank of the United States, Hamilton’s legacy reverberated through the antebellum era and
beyond.1 Morris originally believed that the BONA’s profits would be sufficient to retire the
Congressional debt and envisioned refunding the debt and financing it through a sinking fund
made up of the bank’s profits. Riesman (1987, p. 144) argues that Morris formulated this plan
after reading the work of the English Whig Richard Price, who in 1772 formulated a comparable
plan for extinguishing Britain’s massive debt.
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2. The Bank of North America: The Debate on Corporate Privilege is Joined
TheBankofNorthAmerica(hereafterBONA)wasbornofcrisis.Inspring1781theEnglish
army was moving easily through the South. The currency was depreciated to the point of near
collapse, Congress had exhausted its fiscal resources, patriotic fervor had given wayto frustration,
andAmericanmoralesanklowerbytheday.Facingagravesituation,Congresscentralizedthearmy
andotheradministrativedepartments.ItalsocreatedtheofficeoftheSuperintendentofFinanceand
appointed Robert Morris to the post. The new superintendent was the second most powerful figure
in the reorganized government, second only to George Washington, and was granted almost
complete control over fiscal policy (Rappaport 1970).
Morris entered his post with a sweeping vision of fiscal reform (Riesman 1987). Morris’s
public finance plan featured a bank as its centerpiece, a bank that was to provide assistance during
the war and contributeto thecountry’s postwarprosperity.
1 Rappaport (1970, 1996) contended that
Morris unveiled his banking plan so quickly after assuming office that he must have contemplated
it long before. We know that Hamilton, while still a member of Washington’s staff, twice wrote to
Morris with bank proposals. But Morris thought Hamilton’s schemes too bold, too audacious – one
called for a bank of $200 million capital – and proposed a more modest institution. Morris’s plan
called for a bank with just $400,000 in capital, divided into $400 shares. The difference between
HamiltonandMorrisonthebankwasthatHamiltonenvisionedabankasanarmofgovernmentthat
mightservecommercialinterests; Morris envisioned thebankas arm ofcommercethatmightserve-6-
the government. It did not occur to Morris that the government would own shares, perhaps because
the government was effectively bankrupt and more in need of capital than a supplier of it.
Congress chartered the bank on 31 December 1781, but lingering concerns over whether it
actually had the power to do so led it to ask states to enact similar supporting legislation (Lewis
1882). Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina all
passed enabling legislation. It was not until Morris petitioned the Pennsylvania legislature for a
charter that serious concerns were raised. Critics feared the consequences of the original grant’s
concession of a perpetual charter and its right to amass up to $10 million in assets. The latter was
troublesomebecauseitheldthepotentialfortheestablishmentofa“moniedaristocracy;”theformer
was equally troublesome because a perpetual charter placed the institution beyond subsequent
legislative control. Neither argument gained traction and the bank received its charter.
Except for the profits earned in its early years, the BONA did not become noteworthy until
1785, when the bank’s operations and its charter provoked a larger debate over the meaning of
democracy and the corporation’s place within it. In September 1785, less than four years after
Congress had chartered it, the Pennsylvania Assembly repealed the bank’s charter.
What had the bank done to turn the Assembly against it? To many legislators the better
question was what hadn’t the bank done. Hammond (1957, p. 53) listed the sundry charges leveled
against the bank: it encouraged usury; it refused to lend on long terms to farmers; it refused to lend
onmortgagesecurity,again,tofarmers;itinsistedonpunctualityinmeetingone’sdebtstothebank;
it allowed foreigners (which included not onlyEuropeans, but individuals from neighboring states)
toinvestinthebank;and,itdemonstratedfavoritismtowardcertainborrowers,mostlyshareholders.
The bank’s real sins, however, were its opposition to the chartering of a rival institution, its2 The federal government had repaid its large loans to the bank by selling off the interest
it took when Morris subscribed to $254,000 in stock on its behalf.
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opposition to the state’s emission of £100,000 in bills of credit, its refusal to accept notes issued by
a £50,000 loan office, or land bank and, above all, its adoption of high-pressure lobbying practices
against all three otherwise popular (and populist) measures.
Morris was quick to defend his bank and denied that its agents’ actions in any way
undermined democratic institutions. But his arguments failed to swaymany critics because he was
also quick to point out that it had been established on the idea that it could lend to whomever it saw
fit.Reisman(1987,p.148)observedthatMorriswasblind“tochargesthatthebankwasamonopoly
favoring some and not others” and he failed to grasp why others cared so deeply about the larger
issues raised by the bank and its practices.
Care they did, and deeply, too. Although the bank’s critics provided a laundry list of the
bank’s transgressions, manyofwhich werefallacious, thelegislativecommitteerecommendingthe
annulment of the bank’s charter stated “that the accumulation of enormous wealth in the hands of
a society who claim perpetual duration, will necessarily produce a degree of influence and power,
whichcannotbeentrustedinthehandsofanyonesett[sic]ofmenwhatsoever,withoutendangering




including Morris, failed to take the legislature’s annulment threat seriously, few arguments in
support of the bank were offered until the matter was all but decided. The breadth of opposition to
the bank took its supporters by surprise. The vote to annul was lopsided as legislators from every3 Blodgett is quoted in Dorfman (1946, p. 338).
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region ofthestate, including Philadelphia, voted against thebank. Outsidethelegislature, criticism
camefromallquarters:farmersandmechanicsopposeditbecauseitconfineditsloanstomercantile
firms. Mercantile firms on whom the bank did not bestow its favors opposed it for its favoritism.
The ink on the act annulling the charter was barely dry before plans to have the charter
restored were put in motion. The election of Robert Morris and two of the bank’s other directors to
the assembly, coincident with a mass petitioning campaign asking for reinstatement of the charter
guaranteed that the issue would be revisited. Transcripts of the legislative debates offer a window
intocontemporaryattitudesaboutrepublicangovernmentandwhetheritcouldsurviveeconomicand
financial modernization. The foundational political disagreement centered not on favoritism in
lending or the bank’s opposition to a state loan office and the emission of bills of credit, but on the
internal governance of the bank, which reflected wider concerns with the nature of republican
governance writ large. If the corporation was, as Samuel Blodgett insisted, a “moneyed
commonwealth” within a commonwealth, a “moneyed republic” within a republic, then the nature
of corporate governance reflected on the possibilities and the pitfalls of political governance.
3
Whatwerethegovernancefeaturesinsidethebankthatsooffendedrepublicansensibilities?
Two features of the bank’s internal operations – one share-one vote and the absence of any
mechanism to ensure the rotation in office for directors – became recurring themes of the debate.
AssemblymenLollarandSmilieattackedtheoneshare-onevoteruledirectlybecauseitconcentrated
power, a practice that Smilie argued was “highly dangerous” because it would inevitably lead to
“directtyranny”bythelargeshareholdersoverthesmall(Carey1786,p.109).Heraisedtherhetoric
further by drawing an analogy between the bank and the wider polity, asking whether members of4 It is ironic that legislators voted into office by the fraction of the potential electorate
who met the property requirement for voting spoke against voting rights allocated by wealth. It
was the case, of course, that once a man met the property requirement, he received only one vote
regardless of how many times over he satisfied the requirement. I thank Eugene White for
pointing this out.
5 Harris (2009) reported that it was the charter of the English East Indies company that
established the one shareholder-one vote rule. It was only later that the voting rule was altered.
The original Bank of England charter also imposed a one shareholder-one vote rule (Redlich
1968). Redlich argued that Americans were aware of the Bank of England rule and purposely
adopted an alternative.
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the assembly would ever agree to vest power in any similarly small group of men through a voting
rule that allocated votes by wealth.
4,
5
Greater wealth did not establish a basis for multiple votes in the polity, so there was no
reason forit to doso within thecorporation. Votingpower determined bywealth, in fact, was likely
to spill over into the polity. William Findlay, skilled debater, western Republican, lover of large
beaver hats, and vocal opponent of the bank, provided an alarming vision of proportional voting
rules. Liberal corporate charters, like that given the bank, created not little republics but “little
aristocracies” that would ultimately“engross all the wealth, power, and influence of the state,” and
if made large enough would first monopolize land holding, then trade and finally the government
itself (Carey 1786, pp. 66-69).
The failure of the bank’s charter or bylaws to establish a system of rotation among the
directors also smacked of privilege and aristocracy. It conjured up a vision of aristocrats with
permanent, powerful positions. Evenmoretroublingwas that it conjured a“vision ofplacemen and
tax gatherers [or, in this case, usurers] swarming the countryside .. to support wealthy men in high
places” (Reisman 1987, p. 157). Moreover, without established term limits “the bank will remain
under the present directors, during their lives, which is a direct tyranny” (Carey 1786, p. 109).-10-
In his defense of the bank Robert Morris dismissed Republican concerns as “bugaboo”
(Carey1786,p.58).Insteadofallayingfearsofconcentratedpower,hecelebratedit.Itmightbetrue
that the directors of the bank remained in office for long periods and were elected by “six or seven
men, largely concerned in stock,” but how else might it be? Would it be right for those with small
numbers ofshares tohavepowerequaltothosewith many? “Votingaccordingto property,”Morris
asserted, “is theonlypropermodeofelection”(Carey1786,p.117).Ifthelegislaturewas to tamper
with the proportional voting rule inside the corporation, it may as well pass an agrarian law –
contemporary code words for radical mass reallocation of land from rich to poor – and divide all
propertyequally.Suchwouldbethetyrannyofthesmallshareholdersoverthelargeand,ultimately,
the poor over the rich. So Morris, too, believed the debate over internal corporate governance was
about something deeper and more fundamental than corporate governance per se. If corporate
governance, as constituted in the BONA charter at least, was a mirror in which to view the
potentialities of republican governance generally, Morris liked what he saw inside the bank; his
opponents feared it.
The BONA’s proponents carried the day. The act repealing the charter was itself repealed,
but thelegislature imposed several newrestrictions onthebank,amongthem a14-yearcharter, and
stricter limits on the amount and type of assets it might hold, most notably a restriction on land
ownership except what was needed to operate the bank. The new charter did not overturn the one
share-one vote rule, but under pressure the bank’s shareholders adopted a bylaw that established an
upper limit on the number of votes a single shareholder could cast.
To modern sensibilities, the late-eighteenth century debate over the corporation seems a
tempest in a teapot. To contemporaries, however, the concern was very real. Historians note-11-
contemporarybeliefsthatrepublicswereinherentlyfragile.Therisksweresogreatandtheprospect
of failure so ever present, that the institutions of modernity, including the corporation and all it
represented, spelled its eventual but certain doom (Lewis 1993, p.117). The modern conception of
representative democracy as one in which multiple interest groups vie with one another in shaping
policy had not yet revealed itself to late-eighteenth century politicians, Federalist No. 10
notwithstanding. Most Americans, including those in power or aspiring to it, whether Federalist or
Republican, believed in a “unitary, definable public good and common purpose that could be
discerned and articulated byvirtuous and selfless men” (Sharp 1993, p. 89). This approach became
what later historians labeled the politics of the absolute, or the belief that there was a single,
definable objective and that dissent emerged not from a legitimate and alternate view of the public
good,butfromadesiretounderminetherepublicandsubverttheconstitution(ElkinsandMcKitrick
1993).
An appreciation of the political debates of the 1780s matters because onlyin understanding
it can later state banking policies be understood. Although modern political parties had not yet
emergedbythetimetheoriginalthirteenstatesstartedcharteringbanks,thebattlelineswerealready
sharply drawn. What would later be labeled “Federalist” or “Republican” found expression in the
PennsylvaniadebatestranscribedbyCarey.Moreover,Carey’sdecisiontopublishthetranscriptsput
thedebateonthenationalstageandprovidedthefoundationalargumentsfortwoorthreesubsequent
generations of banking proponents and critics alike. When Sullivan (1792) attacked the
Massachusetts Bank, he expressed many of the same concerns in the same terms as those raised in
the BONA debates. Like the revisions to the BONA charter in 1786, the Massachusetts Bank’s
charterwas amended in 1792in an attempt to place moreeffectivelimits its corporatepowers. That-12-
same year Massachusetts incorporated the Union Bank, the charter of which can only be read as a
legislative attempt to balance the growing demand for commercial banking with democratic
principles. Instead of dividing the Union Bank’s capital stock into $400 (par) shares, as it had done
with the Massachusetts Bank, its $800,000 capital was divided into $8 (par) shares to disperse
shareholding as widely as possible. It was an everyman’s bank and, therefore, neither as prone to
insider favoritism nor as dire a threat to the republic.
3. Alexander Hamilton, the Bank of the United States and Early State Banking Policy
Like Morris a decade earlier, when Hamilton assumed leadership of the Treasury, he was
bedeviled by three questions of public finance: How would the government raise revenues? How
would the government raise funds in anticipation of future revenues? And how would it transfer
funds from the place of collection to the place of disbursement? Hamilton’s answers comprised the
three pillars of the Federalist financial revolution (Sylla 1998). Hamilton’s plan included, among
other features, the Bank of the United States (hereafter BUS).
Hamilton produced a number of documents in support of his plan, but it was his Report on
the Bank that is considered groundbreaking (Cowen 2000; Wright and Cowen 2006), and it reveals
a cognizance of the 1785 BONA debates. His Report did not represent Hamilton’s first thinking
aboutabank.HehadpreviouslycorrespondedwithRobertMorrisaboutthedesirabilityofanational
bank and he was the principal author of the Bank of New York’s 1784 articles of association
(Hammond 1957, Redlich 1968), several features of which found expression in the BUS charter.
Hamilton’s plan for the bank began with a discussion of what the bank should not be. First,
it should not be a land or mortgage bank. It was important that the national bank be a specie-based-13-
commercial bank that could realize and liquidate its assets promptly. Second, it should not be a
whollystate-owned bank. Hamilton understood the importanceofprivateinterest and believed that
the profit motive should guide its operations. Nevertheless, it was imperative that the government
was a part owner so that it could receive dividends and exercise some direction or management.
Third,thebankshouldnotbewithoutsupervision.AvitalelementofHamilton’splanwasthatsome
officerofthestate,preferablytheTreasurysecretary,shouldretaintherighttoconductinquiriesand
inspect its books (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 30).
// Table 1 about here //
The features of the 1791 BUS charter are provided in Table 1, and can be usefully divided
intogeneral provisions, regulations,andgovernancerules. Thegeneralprovisionsincludefeatures
such as the capitalization and share value described in Section 1, how, when and where the shares
would be subscribed and paid for (§2), the time limit of the charter (§3), the reservation of shares
for the government (§11) and the promise to not charter a competing bank for the duration of the
BUS’scharter(§12).RegulatoryprovisionsincludedsuchfeaturesasSection7.8,whichforbadethe
bank from trading in real estate, section 7.9 that limited its banknote issues, section 7.10 that
restricted its dealings in public debt, as well as sections 8 and 9 that prescribed punishments for
violations oftheserestrictions. Finally,andperhaps,mostimportantly, thecharterincluded several
conditions – found mostlyin Sections 4 and7– that established internal governance procedures for
the bank. Internal governance rules, as was evident in the BONA debates, not only affected
shareholders and managers but influenced the perceptions of outsiders.6 Redlich (1968, p. 21) recognized this fact when he wrote: “the tendency to model
charters of newer banks on those of certain older ones led to integration. In fact some bank
charters became models to whole groups of banks in the same state and even elsewhere.” Redlich
was correct, but he failed to trace the influence back to the BUS charter and how it shaped state
banking policy or how it influenced financial sector performance.
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The BUS charter became the model that many legislatures followed in drafting state bank
chartersand,therefore,shapedthecontractualrelationshipbetweenhundredsofbanksandthestates
in which they operated.
6 The nature of these contracts determined how well banks performed their
intermediation functions and how they responded (or failed to respond) to contemporary political
and economic circumstances. This is not to diminish the BUS as an important agent of Treasury’s
fiscal policy or independent monetary policy. Those features of the BUS have been explored
elsewhere(HoldsworthandDewey1910;Timberlake1978;Kaplan1999;Sylla,WrightandCowen
2009).WhatislesswellappreciatedisthefundamentalroletheBUS–andbyimplicationHamilton
– played in shaping state banking policy up to the adoption of free banking by several states after
1837.
// Table 2 about here //
The extent to which the BUS charter influenced state bank policybecomes evident in Table
2, which lists 25 features of the BUS charter and their appearance in the charters of four banks
organized prior to the establishment of the BUS in 1791 and 4 banks chartered thereafter. Some
variant of the most basic general provisions appear in the earliest bank charters (or articles of
association), including the total capital, the number of shares and the grant of corporate status. Few
restrictionsappearinthepre-1791charters.Itisparticularlynotablethattheearliestbankorganizers
imposed relativelyfewinternal governancerules on themselves. Compared to theBUScharter, the-15-
governance rules were a patchwork and tended to the innocuous, such as the requirement that
directors stand for annual reelection. It is notable that not one of the pre-BUS banks afforded
shareholders the right to call extraordinary meetings. Of course, banks might provide some of the
governance features not included in their charters through bylaws or other internal operating rules,
butbylawsprovidedalesserguaranteethatinvestorswouldeverrealizeareturnontheirinvestment
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Directors might change bylaws whenever they no longer suited the
directors’purposessothat,comparedtoexplicitcharterprovisions,internalruleswereasecond-best
guarantee of shareholder rights.
The influence of the BUS charter on state banking policy becomes apparent when we
consider the charters of post-BUS banks. Although the banks listed in Table 2 were not randomly
selected, theyareindicativeofthewideandlong-lastinginfluenceoftheBUScharter.Nearlyevery
charter imposed a time limit, required regular reports of condition to the government, and reserved
somesharesforthestate.Everylegislaturereservedtheright,mostimplicitly,tocharterotherbanks.
There are similar commonalities between the BUS and the state banks in the restrictions placed on
banks’ activities and in the basic corporate governance rules.
4. Hamilton’s legacy in the Near- and Long-Term
This section discusses the consequences of four notable features of the BONA debate and
the BUS charter that influenced later charters: charter time limits, branch banking, government
ownership,andprudentmeanvotingrules.In1791UnitedStatespolicymakersstoodatacrossroads
where theycould adopt BONA-style charters or BUS-style charters. In the main, they opted for the
BUS form, and that choice had notable long-term consequences. The paragraphs below illuminate7 The famous Dartmouth College case (Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton [1819]) had not yet been decided. In Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that corporate grants were protected under the contract clause of the federal
Constitution. Once granted, governments had limited power to amend charters. After Dartmouth
many states introduced clauses into bank charters that reserved the right of the state to amend
them.
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the practical effects of those choices on financial stability and bank ownership.
4.1 Charter time limits
It is notable that, in his 24-point plan for a bank in his Report, Hamilton accepted a de facto
term limit for the BUS (p.31) when earlier in the document he dismissed the suggestion that the
BONA become the national bank because in accepting its Pennsylvania charter it had “rendered
[itself] a mere bank of a particular state, liable to dissolution at the expiration of fourteen years” (p.
26). That it faced the prospect of another contentious rechartering debate in 1800 rendered the
BONA unfit to be a national bank.
Whydidlegislaturesimposetermlimitsonbanks? At least threereasons, twophilosophical
andonepractical,presentthemselves.First,underthetheorythatacharterrepresentedaninviolable
contractbetweenastateandacorporation,aperpetualcharterwastroublesomebecauseitplacedthe




is summarized in Jefferson’s oft-quoted phrase that “the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living”
(Sloan 1993). A fundamental tenet of contemporaryRepublican political philosophyheld that each
generation owed to its successors the freedom to make their own choices. Because it was easier to8 It is notable that Madison was less enthusiastic about regular rewriting of laws than
Jefferson. Madison, in fact, viewed the prospect of rewriting laws every 19 years with alarm
(Sloan 1993, p. 300; see Madison to Jefferson, 4 February 1790). The difference in approach
between the two probably reflects Madison’s pragmatism born of his more extensive legislative
experience. It was also the case that some present improvements were of sufficient magnitude
that it was efficient to burden future generations with some of their costs.
9 In 1830 the Bank of Pennsylvania was required to lend the state $4 million at below-
market rates to assist the state’s ongoing canal building project. It was also forced to accept
responsibility for maintaining the transfer books for the state debt, an uncompensated service that
cost the bank an estimated $9000 per year over the next two decades (Holdsworth 1928, pp. 148-
50).
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renew good laws than repeal bad ones, it was imperative that laws be written with limited duration.
Even bad laws have a constituency, Jefferson observed. Automatic expiration approximatelyevery
20 years would limit thepernicious effectsofbadlaws.
8 Athird, morepragmatic, reason forcharter
term limits reflected the states’ ongoing search for sources of revenue and the discovery by state
assemblies that not onlywereprospectivebankerswerewillingtopayfornewcharters,but existing
bankers would payfor therenewal ofexistingcharters (Schwartz 1947). Charter renewal generated





recharteringeffortssometimes failed. It is ironicthat Hamilton’s bankfellpreytotheveryconcerns
he expressed over transforming the BONA into a national bank – that the term limit on its charter
made it susceptible to political intrigue and, ultimately closure. Although its charter did not expire
until 1811, the bank’s proponents unsuccessfully initiated the recharter process in 1808. Although
TreasurysecretaryAlbertGallatinrecommendedrecharter,theHousebillwasdefeated65-64,while-18-
the Senate deadlocked 17-17 until Vice President Clinton, a political enemy of both Madison and
Gallatin, cast the deciding negative vote (Cowen 2008).
Of the 39recorded congressional speeches on recharter, 35 revisited the constitutionalityof
thebank(ClarkeandHall1832).Hammond(1957)questionsthesincerityofthesestatementsgiven
thatJeffersonandMadison’soriginalconstitutionalconcernshadbeenallayedby1811andGallatin
himself, once a foe of the bank, expressed confidence in it and lauded its utility to treasury
operations. Others objected to foreign ownership, suggesting that British ownership of the bank
underminedAmericanrepublicanism.Butthisargument,too,wasspeciousbecauseforeignowners
could not vote their shares and had little sayin the bank's management. The BUS’s most outspoken
supporters were city bankers who made use of the BUS’s branches to facilitate interregional
remittances and recognized that it might serve as a lender of last resort in a crisis. Most state banks,
however, were pleased with the BUS’s demise because it meant the shuttering of its clearing and
collection functions, which had servedas a check on their own lending and note issues. Thebottom
line: because Hamilton succumbed to pressures to include a charter term limit, the bank was forced
toclosenotfrommalfeasance,mismanagement,ormisfortune,butratherfrompartisanmotivations.
The mistake was repeated in the charter of the Second Bank of the United States and in a
multitude of state bank charters. The storyof President Andrew Jackson’s war on the Second Bank
of the United States is now so well known that it does not bear repeating here, but the 20-year term
limitwrittenintothe1816chartermeantthattheSecondBank’ssurvivalhungonwhetherthebank’s
supporters and, ultimately, its leader–Nicholas Biddle–might bargain with Jackson overtheterms
of the recharter (Hammond 1957; Schlesinger 1946). Neither Biddle nor Jackson was willing to
compromise and the war between these two mightypersonalities resulted in the closing of a proto--19-
central bank whose presence under Biddle's leadership may have mitigated the financial effects of
thepanicof1837(Temin 1969). Asimilardrama, albeit onasmallerstage, was replayed in Indiana
intheearly1850s.Acharterlimit-inducedpoliticalbattlebetweenfreebankingDemocratsandmore





In reservingone-fifth oftheshares ofthe BUS for itself, the federal government becamethe
largest residual claimant to the profits of the country’s single largest enterprise. Several states
followedsuit.Virginia,forexample,subscribedtosharesintheBankofVirginia,whosecharterwas
modeled closely after the BUS charter. North Carolina and Kentucky later followed Virginia’s
example. In taking a direct ownership stake, the state ensured that it received a share of a banks’
profits. It also provided the state with some say, through the appointment of directors, over the
operationsofthebank.Finally,ifthestateneededtoborrowmoney,legislatorsbelievedthatitmight
borrow more readily and on better terms from a bank in which it was a part owner (Esary 1912).
Stateownership,establishedinHamilton’sreportasafundamentalmechanismofcorporate
governance, was not viewed by all contemporaries as desirable. Some believed that “there was no
evil more to be dreaded, except war and pestilence, than a connection between government and
banking”(Esary1912,p.267)andJohnM.FelderofSouthCarolinaspokeofthe“vileconcubinage
of banks and state” (Klebaner 1990, p. 42). Despite such concerns, by1812 a majorityof the states10 Dividends arising from these holdings, as well as bank taxes, represented a significant




State-owned enterprises are typically justified in that they will correct a market failure and
are expected to improve resource allocation and overall welfare (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). An
alternativeviewholdsthatstate-ownedenterprisesarecreatedbypoliticianstopursuethegoalsand
interests of politicians, not the community at large (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). If they fall under
politicalcontrol,state-ownedenterprisesbecomesourcesofinefficiencybecausethey(mis)allocate
resources to favored groups. The evidence on state ownership of banks in modern economies is not
positive. State ownership is associated with lower rates of productivity and economic growth, less
efficient private finance, greater credit risk and lower management efficiency, and lending not to
credit constrained but to politicallyconnected firms (La Porta et al 2002; Sapienza 2004; Cornett et
al 2010).
Berg and Haber (2009), however, argue that the manifold problems that have emerged with
state-owned enterprises, especially among banks in the twentieth century, may not have been as
severe in the nineteenth century. The US experience is best described as mixed. Vermont, for
example, chartered a state-owned bank in 1806. By the time it was closed in 1812, it had suffered
$200,000 ($3.7 billion in 2008 dollars) in losses and land owners paid additional assessments to
reimburse creditors (Klebaner 1990; Root 1895). State-owned banks also failed, with significant
losses to creditors, in Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and Illinois (see Table 3).
// Table 3 about here //-21-
Hamilton, of course, did not propose full state ownership; he proposed that the government
takea20percentstake.But20 percent mayhavebeen enoughto establish effectivecontrol overthe
board, which rendered even those banks with less than 100 percent state ownership state banks (La
Portaet al 1999). Theevidencein Table3onthepartlystate-owned banks is not easilysummarized
either. Virginia’s early experience may be indicative of the pitfalls surrounding mixed public and
private banks. Chartered in 1804 and organized in 1805, it quicklybecame clear that the legislature
was determined to exercise as much control over the Bank of Virginia (whose charter is as close to
acopyoftheBUScharterasany)aspossible.Underthebank’scharter,thestatecouldvoteall3000
ofits shares while the maximum number of votes afforded anyother shareholder was limited to 30.
Additionally, the state treasurer was an ex officio member of the board. Thus, the state wielded
inordinate power over the board.
InearlyJanuary1805,theRepublican-dominatedstateassemblyadopted,bya124to14vote,
a resolution instructing the state treasurer to “procure a compleat [sic] preponderance of persons of
sound [R]epublican principles” to the bank’s board. The resolution, in fact, instructed the treasurer
toinsurethat thefourteen-memberboardoftheRichmondbranchhaveatleasttenRepublicansand
thateachthirteen-memberboardofthebrancheshavenineRepublicans.Inthe1805boardelections,
the state cast 3,000 of 5,107 ballots (even though it owned only 20% of the shares) and, not
surprisingly, each branch had either nine or ten Republican directors. It is notable that in August
1805 the bank’s share prices were depressed and one newspaper attributed the low prices to
shareholder uncertainty over the consequences of partisan boards. Despite the politicized nature of
the bank’s boards in its early days, the Bank of Virginia established a strong dividend record and
survived to the Civil War (Starnes 1931).-22-
No systematic inquiry into the performance of state-owned banks in the nineteenth century
UnitedStatesexists,butifthemodernrecordisindicative,thelikelihoodthattheywereanetbenefit
is low. On the other hand, evidence on failure rates implies that no easy conclusion can be drawn
withoutadeeperunderstandingofthelegalandpoliticalconstraintsunderwhicheachbankoperated
ineachstate.Ahandfulofsuccessstoriesinthenineteenthcenturycertainlycountersthechargethat
state-owned institutions are inherently flawed. The available evidence and existing interpretations
are not inconsistent with the possibility that economies in the early stages of development, such as
Indiana, Tennessee and Missouri circa 1835, faced some market failure that a well run state bank
mitigated.
4.3 Branch banking
Alexander Hamilton was not of a single mind in his remarks on branching in the Report. At
onepoint,hecontendedthatbranchingwas problematicand best avoided, but laterin thedocument
he remarked on the utility of branches. These statements were probably less symptomatic of
inconsistencyof thought than imprecision in expression: Hamilton favored branches, but onlyonce
the BUS was established and had developed the internal controls and managerial capabilities
necessary to keep them in check. But if Hamilton was of two minds on branch banking, he was not
alone among his contemporaries and several subsequent generations of United States bankers.
Branch banking never gained a foothold in New England or the Mid-Atlantic region. Ironically,
branch banking took hold and prospered south and west of Maryland, the home states of those
Republicans most opposed to the size and scope granted the BUS in its charter.
Branch banking was attractive in the South and Old Northwest because large branch banks-23-
consolidated small, scattered pools of capital that may have been invested in undercapitalized
financial institutions in the absence of larger, often state-sponsored branch banks. When scattered
pools of private capital were supplemented with direct state investment, public confidence in many
ofthesebankswasenhanced,fearsof"vileconcubinage"notwithstanding.Confidenceinthebanks'
abilities to meet their obligations encouraged the use of bank money, which reinforced the banks'
intermediary abilities and encouraged the spread of the market. To the extent that developed,
functioning markets are public goods, state sponsorship of banks in regions not yet fullywithin the
orbit of such markets was an instance of state-sponsored enterprises solving a market failure
(Friedman 2005).
One common justification for branch banking is that it provides opportunities for portfolio
diversification, hence stability, unavailable to unit banks. Given the underlying economies of the
states in which branch banking emerged -- Virginia, North and South Carolina, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Ohio and Indiana -- it is not clear that branch banking facilitated anything other than
geographic diversification. These were not economies with notable manufacturing and even the
mercantile sector was small compared to that in New England and the Mid-Atlantic. The fortunes
ofthesebankswasheavilydependentonshipmentsofcotton,grainandotherprimaryproducts.Bad
weather and bad prices led to bad loans, no matter how the loans were spread among the branches.
The real advantage of branch banking in the antebellum South and West -- interbank
cooperation -- became apparent in crises. Intrabank and interbank cooperation arose among branch
banks during the panics of 1837 and 1857 (Bodenhorn 2003; Calomiris and Schweikart 1991).
During the panic of 1837, for example, Kentucky's branch banks labored to maintain specie
payments after theircorrespondents in Philadelphia and New Orleans had suspended. Surprisingly,-24-
two of the state's largest banks -- the Bank of Kentuckyand the Northern Bank of Kentucky-- were
able to maintain their pre-panic levels of loans and circulation through summer 1837, even while
they increased their specie holdings. When the Northern Bank was run in August 1837, it met the
specie calls and survived the run mostly because its rival, the Bank of Kentucky, came to its aid.
Interbanklendingincreasedsharplyinlatesummer1837andtheKentuckybranchbanksweathered
the panic about as well as any state's system.
The State Bank of Ohio's branch and mutual guarantee features also allowed that system to
survive the panic of 1857, even though the banks were heavy creditors of the failed Ohio Life
Insuranceand Trust Company. TheStateBank avoided suspension and failurebecauseits mutually
insuredbranchescooperatedwithoneanotherduringthepanic.AlthoughtheStateBankofOhiowas
not a branch bank in the traditional sense, they formed a federation of banks under a common
supervisory and regulatory board. Each bank was autonomously managed, but each was
proportionatelyresponsiblefortheliabilitiesofthe30othermembers, whichprovidedeachwithan
incentive to monitor the actions of all others in good times. In a panic, this structure created
incentives to assist others facing a run. During the panic, in fact, stronger banks supplied reserves
to weaker orvulnerablebanks. Noneof the State Bank's members failed, compared to the failure of
nearly half of neighboring Indiana's independent banks.
Hammond (1957) commended Canadians for adopting charters closely modeled on that of
Hamilton's BUS, charters that included the right to establish branches. Unlike the United States,
wherebranchingwasconfinedtothelesseconomicallydevelopedregions,branchinginCanadawas
ubiquitous. In this feature, at least, "the handiwork of Alexander Hamilton ... survives still in the
Dominion [of Canada]" (Hammond 1957, p. 662). Although the Canadians embraced branch-25-
banking at the expense of oligolopy, the citizenry benefitted from greater stability and many fewer
failures during panics and recessions (Bordo, Rockoff and Redich 1994). It is well known that no
Canadian bank failed during the Great Depression, though thousands of branches were closed.
Branch closings, however, were not as destabilizing as bank failures.
Some of the states that followed Hamilton's lead and adopted branch banking in the
nineteenth century, anticipated the Canadian experience in that they reaped the benefits of greater
stabilityandpaidthecostsofmodestlyhigherinterestrates(BodenhornandRockoff1992).Wasthe
tradeoff welfare enhancing? Consider the Indiana experience. When the branched State Bank of
Indiana dominated in the early 1850s, borrowers were charged interest rates about 1.4 percentage
points higher than borrowers in New York City (ibid, p.177). The State Bank had about $1 million
inoutstandingloansatanytimeintheearly1850sandthestatehad988,000inhabitants.Ifthebank's
loansturnedoverabout2.5timesperyears,theannual percapitainterest ratecostsofmarketpower
amounted to 3.6 cents. When the State Bank's charter lapsed and it was replaced by free banks, an
average of two of which failed each year with annual losses of nearly $80,000 (Economopoulos
1988). With 1.35 million inhabitants in 1860, the annual per capita loss due to bank failure was 5.9
cents. For Indiana in the late antebellum era, at least, the cost of bank instability exceeded the cost
of bank monopoly, unless the deadweight losses of monopoly exceeded the deadweight losses of
instability-inducedreducedmoneyholdings.Branchbanking,then,providedseveralbenefitstobank
customers,themostnotableofwhichwasgreaterstability.ItisunclearwhetherHamiltonconsidered
this a likely outcome, but it was certainly a valuable by-product.
3.4 Voting rules-26-
Voting rights, especially how votes would be cast and by whom, represented a critical
governance feature outlined in the Report and in the BUS charter. Hamilton's Report and the BUS
charter had three important voting rights clauses. First, foreign shareholders were excluded from
voting their shares and exercising any direct control rights. Foreigners retained residual claims to
profits, but were unable to influence management, at least through their voting power. “Due
caution,” wrote Hamilton, was called for in order to “guard against a foreign influence insinuating
itself” into the bank (Clarke and Hall 1832, p.28).
Second,item11oftheReport recommendedproxyvoting.Hamiltonrecognizedthatliberal
voting rights assured stockholders that managers could not substantially modify the terms of the
stockholders’ investment without their consent. Liberal voting rights limited managerial discretion
and protected against expropriation (Baum 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). Of course occasions might
arise when substantial modifications to the charter contract might benefit stockholders so that
gaining their consent was vital. Because share holding was geographically dispersed and
transportation costly, shareholder meetings at which corporate policymight be renegotiated would
be prohibitivelycostlyto organize and mediate. Proxyvoting reduced the costs of gaining majority
consentandeffectingchangeincorporatepolicy.Charterclausesallowingproxyvotingaremissing
from all pre-1792 charters. After the clause is included in the BUS charter, it becomes ubiquitous
in state bank charters. In this instance, the BUS influence on state banking policy is unmistakable.
A system of voting rights that Hamilton labeled the “prudent mean” represented the third
important governance feature included in the BUS charter that found it way into several state
banking systems. The BONA debates highlighted the gravity with which contemporaries viewed
corporatevoting.“Likecivicgovernance,”wroteDunlavy(2006),“corporategovernancehasmany-27-
dimensions,buttherearegoodreasonstosingleoutvotingrightsasitsfoundation.”Dunlavy(2006)
classified votingrights alongacontinuum from “plutocratic”(one share-onevote) to “democratic”
(one shareholder-one vote), with all manner of variation in between. Hamilton labeled one point
along the continuum the “prudent mean,” which he defined with the following voting rule:
For one share, and not more than two shares, one vote; for everytwo shares above two, and
not exceeding ten, one vote; for every four shares above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one
vote; for every six shares above thirty, and not exceeding sixty, one vote; for every eight
sharesabovesixty,andnotexceedingonehundred,onevote; andforeverytensharesabove
one hundred, one vote; but no person, co-partnership, or body politic, shall be entitled to a
greater number than thirty votes (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 32).
Hamilton offered his prudent mean voting rule because he considered the one share-one vote rule
adopted by the BONA “improper” and the one shareholder-one vote rule “not less erroneous”
(Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 28).
The plutocratic rule of one share-one vote increased the likelihood that a few stockholders
might take control of the bank and direct its resources to their advantage and to the detriment of
minorityshareholders.Concentrationofabout20percentofsharesappearssufficienttotakecontrol
of a modern corporation, and given the communication and transportation network circa 1800, 20
percent was surely enough to take effective control (La Porta et al 1999). It was on this issue that
Morris and Hamilton’s visions of proper corporate governance diverged. In the BONA debates,
Morrisadamantlydefendedoneshare-onevoterulesastheonlyavailablemechanismtoprotectlarge
shareholders from the depredations of the minority. Hamilton was not only more concerned about
theabilityoflargeshareholderstosubvertthecorporationtothedetrimentofminorityshareholders,
but about political appearances. In advocating a prudent mean voting rule, Hamilton successfully
walked a tightrope: he simultaneously undermined political objections to plutocratic voting rules,-28-
protected minority shareholders by affording them disproportionately large voting representation,
and still encouraged large bloc investment by offering larger shareholders a greater measure of
control over the bank’s operations than a democratic one shareholder-one vote rule would have
afforded.
Although one share-one vote rules were common by the end of the nineteenth century
(Morris’sviewultimatelyprevailed),atthebeginningofthecenturymostAmericansremainedwary
of power vested with large shareholders under one share-one vote rules and, instead, adopted rules
more akin to Hamilton’s prudent mean (Dunlavy2006). Lines 21 and 21a in Table 2, again, reveal
BUSinfluenceonAmericancorporategovernance,atleastforthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury.
None of the pre-BUS charters adopted a prudent mean-type rule. Many, but not all banks, adopted
it thereafter. As a measure of the limits placed on large stockholders, Line 21a reports the number
of votes a stockholder holding 25 shares was allowed to cast at a stockholder’s meeting. While the
Hartford Bank adopted the one share-one vote rule, the other banks adopted rules that gave a
shareholder with 25 shares only nine votes – the same rule imposed on stockholders in the BUS.
Variationsquicklyappeared:stockholderswith25sharescouldcast8votesatshareholdermeetings
in NewJersey, 10 votes at meetings in New Hampshire, 11 votes in Ohio, 12 or13 in Missouri, but
only 6 in Georgia. Connecticut developed no hard and fast rule, but rather responded to the
organizers’ wishes. Onlytwo of the first ten banks chartered in Connecticut adopted prudent mean
voting rules. The other eight adopted one share-one vote rules.
Thatsomestatesadoptedprudentmeanvotingwhileothersadoptedoneshare-onevoterules
affords an opportunity to determine whether the prudent mean rule had any meaningful effect on
shareholding. State bank commissioners occasionally published the names and share holdings of11 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [(HHI) = (1,000)*Gsi
2 ] can assume any value
between 0 and 10,000. A value of 10,000 implies ownership by one shareholders. A value
approaching 0 implies completely atomized ownership. HHI values for the range between 75 and
10,000, and the standard deviation is 1,756.
12 Using the turnover of shares as a proxy for dispersion of ownership, Wright (1999)
concludes that shares were widely dispersed. The concentration ratios at points in time suggest
otherwise. Of course, there is no consensus on the values of the various concentration measures
that separate concentrated from dispersed ownership. Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo (2007)
contend that an average HHI of 1,500 for the modern Spanish publicly-traded corporation is high,
especially when compared to an average HHI of 570 for the modern British publicly-traded
corporation (Trojanowski and Renneboog 2002).
-29-
bank shareholders in the antebellum era. These records were combined with voting rules included
in bank charters. Data on 69 banks from five states (Connecticut, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin) between the 1830s and 1850s show that the average concentration ratio for the 20
largest shareholdings (i.e., CR-20) was 0.79. That is, the 20 largest shareholders owned nearly 80
percent of the outstanding shares of the sample banks. The Herfindahl-Hirshman index of share
ownership was 1355.
11 The CR-20 and HHI values suggest fairly concentrated bank share
ownership: the mean of the sample was $125,000 in paid-in capital owned by 67 shareholders.
12
To betterunderstand theassociation between thedispersionofshareownershipandprudent
meanvotingrules,Iregressedshareholderconcentrationmeasuresagainstaprudentmeanindicator
variable, in addition to measures of the bank's age (more time for shares to either disperse or
concentrate), nominal capital stock (larger banks had more available shares), and state dummy
variables. The estimated coefficient on the prudent mean indicator coefficient when regressed on
CR-20 was -0.24 (t-statistic=5.80; p<0.001), which implies that the20largestshareholdersowned
approximately one-fourth less of the outstanding shares of banks with prudent mean voting rules
compared to banks with one share-one vote rules. When CR-20 was replaced with the HHI as the-30-
dependent variable, the coefficient on the prudent mean indicator variable was -216.4 (t-statistic =
1.7; p < 0.10). At the mean HHI a prudent mean voting rule reduced share owner concentration by
about 12 percent of the standard deviation in HHI.
The sample is too small and the estimating technique too crude to draw causal inferences,
but thesizeandsignificanceoftheassociation suggests that earlynineteenth-centuryminoritybank
shareholderswereconcernedwithmajorityshareholderexpropriation.Minorityshareholdingswere
muchmorecommonandrepresentedalargerfractionofbankownershipwhencharterslimitedlarge
shareholder control through prudent mean voting rules. More research is required, but the results
suggest that if the organizers' principal concern was raising outside capital, they might prefer a
prudent mean share voting rule to encourage dispersed ownership. If the organizers' principal
concern was retaining control of the bank, they probably preferred a one share-one vote rule.
Thecorporategovernanceissues surroundingvotingrules rundeeperthanhorizontalpower
relations inside the firm, however. Although, large bloc shareholding might improve managerial
performance because large shareholders had greater incentives to monitor, nineteenth-century
Americans also recognized that large bloc holdings come at a cost: large shareholders might adopt
rulesorpoliciesthatdisadvantageorexpropriatefromsmallshareholders(ShleiferandVishny1986;
Holderness and Sheehan 2000). It remains to be determined whether dispersed ownership,
encouraged by prudent mean voting rules, or more concentrated ownership, encouraged by one
share-one vote rules, resulted in more profitable, more prudent, more stable banks.
4. Conclusion
It is historically inaccurate to think about Federalist banking policy as a clearly articulated-31-
set of objectives, statutes and administrative regulations. Federalist banking policy was an attitude
andalooselyconstructedapproachtotheestablishmentofandcontroloverfinancialintermediaries.
ThecleareststatementofthatapproachisfoundinHamilton’sReportonaNationalBankandinthe
charter of the Bank of United States. These were the documents that defined two generations of the
contract between states and their banks. Although Hamilton was a student of history, as were many
of his contemporaries, he had limited guidance in how to construct a bank and almost no guidance
inconstructingasystem.ItisclearthattheBankofEnglandcharterinfluencedFederalistapproaches
to banking (Andréadès 1909), but the politicians and the bankers of the time were making up much
of the script as they went along.
This is not to say that the Federalists did not impose some structure on their banks, which
later developed into a banking system. They imposed structure and order through the charters they
granted.Federalpoliciesbecamestatepoliciesbecausestatelegislatorshadthesameconcernsasthe
founders about the relationship between business and government and adopted BUS charter as a
model in creating state systems. It was an organic process and the model evolved over time, of
course, but the Bank of the United States’s DNA remains evident in state bank charters several
generations removed from the 1791 original.
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Table 1: Features of Bank of the United States Charter
Originally Proposed by Hamilton and Adopted by Congress
Charter
Section
Provisions of the Bank of the United States charter (1791)
1 $10 million capital in $400 shares
2 Individual subscriptions limited to 1,000 shares. Shares payable -- 1/4 in specie, 3/4 in 6% federal
bonds -- in four instalments
3 Bank granted corporate powers for 20 years and may hold up to $15 million in real and personal
property
4 Bank governed by 25 directors subject to annual reelection. President to be chosen from among the
elected directors.
5 Bank may commence as soon as $400,000 in capital is paid in.
6 Directors have power to appoint managers and determine managerial compensation.
7.1 Prudent mean voting rule for shareholders. Only shareholders resident in US could vote by proxy.
7.2 Only 3/4 of existing directors eligible for reelection.
7.3 Directors must be shareholders.
7.4 Directors will not be paid for services unless specifically approved by shareholders.
7.5 Board quorum is 7 directors.
7.6 Any 60 stockholders with a combined 200 shares could call a special meeting of stockholders.
7.7 Officers required to post performance bonds.
7.8 Bank may only so much land as required for the conduct of business or that surrendered in
judgment.
7.9 Bank's debts (banknotes) may not exceed $10 million. Directors are personally liable for any
excess.
7.10 Bank may sell any of the public debt used to purchase shares, but it cannot buy additional bonds.
Its trade will be limited to bills of exchange and specie. Interest charges limited to 6%.
7.11 Loans to state, federal or foreign governments limited without express Congressional consent.
7.12 Stock transferrable by rules adopted by directors.
7.13 Debts signed by president and countersigned by cashier are negotiable and transferable.
7.14 Semi-annual dividends payable from profits at discretion of directors.
7.15 Branch offices may be opened wherever directors see fit.
7.16 Secretary of Treasury may inspect the bank's books at any time, not more often than once each
week.Table 1: Features of Bank of the United States Charter
Originally Proposed by Hamilton and Adopted by Congress
Charter
Section
Provisions of the Bank of the United States charter (1791)
-39-
8 All officers and directors who trade or authorize trade in goods not allowed by charter are subject
to treble damages.
9 All officers and directors who loan or authorize loans to governments in amounts in excess of
limits are subject to treble damages.
10 Bank's notes are receivable for all debts to United States.
11 President of the United States may, at his discretion, subscribe to one-fifth of the bank's stock. The
bank shall loan the amount to the government.
12 No other bank will be chartered by Congress during the term of the 20-year charter.
Sources: Hamilton's Report reprinted in Clarke and Hall (1832, pp. ). Bank of the United States charter reprinted
in Holdsworth and Dewey (1910, pp. 126-132).-40-
Table 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks



























1. Capital stock $300,000 $1m $100,000 $3m $1.2m $800,000
2. Share values $300 $500 $100 $400 $300 $100
3. Corporate status T T T T T T T T
4. Term limit (years) 20 20 20 21
5. Reports to government T T T T
6. State ownership option T T T T T
7. Monopoly charter
Regulations
8. Nonbank assets limits T T T T T
9. Limit on trade in
merchandise T T T T T
10. Performance bonds T T T T
11. Debt limits T T T T T
12. Note redemption T T T TTable 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks



























13. Limits on government
lending T T T*
14. Interest rate ceilings T T T T
Governance provisions
15. Large board 12 12 13 9 25 15 15
16. Quorum 7 3 13 9 6
17. Annual reelection T T T T T T
18. Rotation in office T T T T T
19. Director citizenship T T T T T T
20. Directors determine
executive compensation T T T T T T
21. Prudent mean voting T T T T T
21a. Votes for 25 shares 25 25 21 9 25 9 9 9
22. Proxy voting T T T TTable 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks
































from profits T T T T T
Notes: * Lending limited to foreign, bit not domestic governments.-43-
Table 3: Selected experiences with state bank ownership
State Years State ownership
(percent)
Failed Notes
Maryland 1790- 15% N Profitable, but required support of transportation
infrastructure and banks generated low returns to
shareholders
Pennsylvania 1793-1857 20 Y Bank of Pennsylvania profitable until asked to bail
out state investments in Main Line Canal
Virginia 1804-1865 20 N Profitable, well managed; state divested in 1850s
Vermont 1806-1811 100 Y Land tax assessment to repay creditors
Kentucky 1806-1821 20 Y Undermined by state policies
Delaware 1807- 20 N Independent of state intervention, profitable
North Carolina 1810-1835 20 Y Cotton speculation soured and led to bankruptcy
South Carolina 1812-1870 100 N Profitable, focused on agricultural lending and
avoided competition with private commercial
banks
Indiana 1816-1821 37 Y Poor management led to charter revocation
Mississippi 1818- 50 Y Finances undermined by state's railroad
investments
Tennessee 1820-1832 100 Y Taxpayers reimbursed bank's creditors
Illinois 1821-1824 100 Y Poorly managed and failed quickly
Alabama 1823- 100 Y Taxpayers reimbursed bank's creditors
Georgia 1828- 100 Y State lost "large amount;" taxpayers reimbursed
bank's creditors
North Carolina 1833-1863 40 N Not well regarded by contemporaries
Indiana 1834-1857 50 N Profitable, well regarded, charter not renewed
Missouri 1837- 50 N Profitable, well managed
Tennessee 1838-1868 100 N Bank returned dividend to state, but struggled
underwriting state railroad investments
Sources: Root (1895), Starnes (1931), Duke (1895), Bryan (1899), Holdsworth (1928).